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COMMENTS
Contributory negligence presents a particularly difficult
question in crossing accident cases, because the reasonableness
of plaintiff's conduct depends largely upon the conduct of the
railroad's employees. For example, the care required of the
driver of an automobile approaching a crossing varies with the
presence or absence at the crossing of automatic signals, gates,
or watchmen.4 2 The driver's duty is also affected by his familiar-
ity with the crossing and his knowledge of its dangers. 43 Simi-
larly, the care required of the driver increases with the difficulty
of seeing or hearing approaching trains.
44
Usually, the momentum of a moving train is too great for
it to stop in the few moments between the time at which a
careful trainman could appreciate plaintiff's peril and the time
of the train's arrival at the crossing.45 For this reason, plaintiffs
have had little success invoking the doctrine of last clear chance
against a defense of contributory negligence in crossing collision
cases.
J. Bennett Johnston, Jr.
Substantive Due Process of Law and Civil Liberties
In recent years, the Supreme Court of the United States has
seemed increasingly willing to accord state legislation in the field
of civil liberties the same presumption of validity enjoyed by
state economic regulation.
Until the early 1930's, the Court frequently considered state
legislation regulating business activity repugnant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For instance,
state regulation of prices charged by businesses not "affected
with a public interest" was regarded as depriving persons engaged
in such businesses of their property without due process of law.1
42. Levy v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945).
43. Stelly v. Texas & N.O.R.R., 49 So.2d 640 (La. App. 1950); Butler v.
Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 46 F. Supp. 905 (W.D. La. 1942), aff'd, 141 F.2d 492
(5th Cir. 1944); accord, O'Connor v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 40 So.2d 663 (La.
App. 1949); Ashy v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 186 So. 395 (La. App. 1939).
44. See note 9 supra.
45. Matthews v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 45 So.2d 547 (La. App. 1950);
Teston v. Thompson, 77 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. La. 1948); Levy v. New Orleans
& N.E.R.R., 20 So.2d 559 (La. App. 1945); McClain v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 200
So. 57 (La. App. 1941); Washington v. Yazoo & M.V.R.R., 11 La. App. 635,
124 So. 631 (1929).
1. See, e.g., Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928); Tyson & Bros. v.
Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
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In another area of state action, the Court declared state wage
and hour regulation unconstitutional, interpreting the Due
Process Clause as a guarantee of "liberty of contract. ' 2 A sharp
change in the Court's attitude toward state economic regulation
appeared in Nebbia v. New York,5 decided in 1934. In that case,
the Court, upholding a state statute authorizing milk price regu-
lation, abandoned the old distinction between those businesses
"affected with a public interest" and subject to price regulation,
and other businesses theretofore exempt from such regulation.
Three years later, in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,4 the Court
upheld a state minimum wage law against the claim that it
violated the employer's freedom of contract. The Court made it
unmistakably clear in that case that it would no longer invalidate
state economic legislation reasonably adapted to the accomplish-
ment of its object. Subsequent decisions in the field of economic
due process have adopted this broad principle.5
State legislation in the field of civil liberties, however, has
been viewed in a different light. One writer explains, "The rea-
sonable-man test was appropriate in all other fields; but where
the basic freedoms of the First Amendment were at issue, then
the judiciary had to hold itself and the legislature to higher
standards. These higher standards were required because of the
'preferred position' which the Constitution gives to the basic First
Amendment freedoms."6 It is believed that a brief review of
the cases involving freedom of speech will show that the Court
has gradually abandoned the view that civil liberties occupy this
preferred position.
The first important speech case presented to the Court, in
1919, involved the indictment and conviction of the defendants
under the Federal Espionage Act for circulating leaflets urging
men to resist the draft.7 In affirming the conviction Justice
Holmes announced a principle frequently applied in subsequent
cases involving freedom of speech:
"The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
2. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
3. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
4. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
5. See Note, 24 IND. L. J. 451, 455 (1949) and authorities cited therein.
6. PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 32-33 (1954).
7. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."" (Italics
supplied.)
Six years later, however, a completely new test was applied by
the Court in Gitlow v. New York. 9 Gitlow was convicted under
the New York Criminal Anarchy Act for circulating Communist
literature. It can hardly be said that his conduct presented a
"clear and present danger." In affirming his conviction, the Court
applied what has been termed the "bad tendency" test. Although
this test was never repudiated, the Court did not apply it during
the following years when freedom of speech continued to occupy
a preferred position.10
In United States v. Carolene Products Co.," decided in 1938,
Justice Stone, in a footnote, suggested a view which the Court
apparently held throughout the following decade. The decision
upheld certain federal economic legislation against the claim that
it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The
footnote stated in part:
"There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre-
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution,
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Four-
teenth.''1 2 (Italics supplied.)
The high point of the Court's preferential treatment of civil
liberties appears in Thornhill v. Alabama,3 decided in 1940,
where the Court invalidated a state statute forbidding all picket-
ing. Justice Murphy, speaking for the Court, stated that the
freedom of speech and press embraces at least the liberty to
discuss all matters of public concern publicly and truthfully with-
out previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. In the
8. Id. at 52.
9. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
10. CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS 122 (9th ed. 1950).
11. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
12. Id. at 152, n. 4. Yet, earlier that year a similar view could be derived
from Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion declaring a city ordinance void on
its face as a violation of speech and press contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
13. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). This decision reaffirms the Court's position in a
number of speech cases since Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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Thornhill decision the statute involved was clearly denied the
presumption of validity which the Court had traditionally ac-
corded state legislation. Only one Justice dissented from the
opinion in the Thornhill case; four, however, dissented in Thomas
v. Collins,'14 decided five years later. In that case the Court de-
clared invalid a Texas statute requiring labor organizers to regis-
ter with a state official before soliciting membership in labor
unions. The dissenting Justices seem to have placed the question
presented by petitioner's conviction under the statute in the field
of economic due process while the majority treated the issue as
one of freedom of speech. 15
In 1948 a city ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks
was held unconstitutional in Saia v. New York,' 6 with Justices
Frankfurter, Reed, Burton, and Jackson dissenting. Without a
change in personnel the Court upheld a similar city ordinance in
Kovacs v. Cooper," decided in 1949, Chief Justice Vinson having
joined the four Justices who dissented in the Saia case. The
majority, attempting to distinguish Saia v. New York, noted that
the ordinance in that case placed a previous restraint on free
speech, whereas the one involved in the Kovacs case applied only
to amplifiers that emitted "loud and raucous" noises. Justice
Jackson concurred with the majority in the Kovacs case but
thought its holding conflicted with Saia v. New York. That same
year Justice Murphy, who wrote the opinion in Thornhill v. Ala-
bama, and Justice Rutledge, who wrote the opinion in Thomas v.
Collins, died.' 8 Justices Black and Douglas remained as the chief
defenders of the preferred position given to civil liberties in the
past.
Several cases followed which prove interesting in the light
14. 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
15. Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Rutledge were the only new
replacements, and the former, concurring, stated: "Free speech on both sides
and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to me a constitu-
tional and useful right .... And if the employees or organizers associate vio-
lence or other offense against the laws with labor's free speech, or if the
employer's speech is associated with discriminatory discharges or intimida-
tion, the constitutional remedy would be to stop the evil, but permit the
speech, if the two are separable. ... Id. at 547. It might be said that Mr.
Justice Jackson found it difficult to apply this standard in later speech cases.
16. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
17. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
18. Although the Kovacs case explained the view of the majority which
was to remain intact for some time, the loss of Mr. Justices Murphy and
Rutledge might be important in regard to the granting of certiorari. Four
votes are necessary to bring a case up by that method. In the Flag saluting
cases the writ had been denied more than once for want of a substantial
federal question before the issue was finally decided. West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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of the Thornhill decision. In one case 19 the Court upheld an
injunction against picketing aimed at inducing an ice company
to refrain from selling to non-union peddlers. Acquiescence in
the picketers' demands would have violated the state's antitrust
law. Perhaps the decision can be reconciled with the rationale
of the Thornhill case by considering the picketing as economic
activity not deserving preferred constitutional protection. In an-
other case, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke,'20
an automobile repairman and his three sons, as co-partners, were
picketed by a labor union seeking a union shop. The Court sus-
tained an injunction against the picketing and rejected the
union's claim that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed the
right to picket peacefully. It is noteworthy that Justice Minton,
dissenting, saw the end of the Thornhill era.21
Court activity also proved interesting during 1951 and 1952.
In Breard v. City of Alexandria,2 the Court upheld a municipal
ordinance which forbade soliciting orders for merchandise with-
out first obtaining the permission of the owners or occupants to
enter the premises. The majority found no conflict with an earlier
decision28 invalidating an ordinance that prohibited the distri-
bution of literature at private residences. The only distinction
between the two cases would seem to be that the earlier case
dealt with distribution of free religious literature, while the
Breard case involved commercial solicitation.
In Feiner v. New York,'24 decided in 1951, petitioner made an
inflammatory speech containing derogatory remarks about the
President, the American Legion, and local officials. To prevent
an outbreak of violence, the police asked the petitioner to stop
speaking. After his third refusal he was arrested and convicted
of violating the Penal Code of New York which forbade inciting
a breach of the peace. The conviction was upheld by the Court
on the grounds that a community has a right to maintain peace
and order on its public streets. Justice Black, dissenting, thought
that the police should have made all reasonable efforts to protect
19. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
20. 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
21. Id. at 483. See also Note, Free Speech and Picketing for 'Unlawful
Objectives," 16 U. OF CM. L. REV. 701, 704 (1949) for a discussion of a modi-
fication of the Thornhill rule. Comment, Constitutional Law-Due Process
of Law-Thornhill Re-Examined, 49 MIcH. L. REV. 1048 (1951); Jones, The
Right to Picket-Twilight Zone of the Constitution, 102 U. OF PA. L. REV. 995
(1954).
22. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
23, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
24, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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the speaker and preserve order before taking such action. A
similar fact situation had been presented in Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 25 two years before the Feiner case. The petitioner addressed
a large audience in an auditorium while an angry crowd pro-
tested outside. The speech contained criticism of various political
and racial groups. His conviction was reversed by the Court in a
five-to-four decision on the grounds that the trial court had in-
correctly instructed the jury. Justice Jackson, vigorously dis-
senting, said, "There is danger, that if the Court does not temper
its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert
the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact. ' 26
Beauharnais v. Illinois,27 a 1952 decision, upheld the convic-
tion of the petitioner for distributing anti-Negro leaflets on the
streets of Chicago in violation of an Illinois "group libel" law.
The majority concluded that the law was directed at a defined
evil which the state had a right to suppress. Since the majority
considered the utterances libelous and not within the area of
protected speech, they found it unnecessary to apply the "clear
and present danger" test. This decision clearly indicates that the
Court is narrowing the scope of the "clear and present danger"
test; it also shows that the Court is inclined to entertain a pre-
sumption of validity for state statutes in the field of civil liber-
ties. Burstyn v. Wilson,2 decided in 1952, seems at first blush to
indicate the contrary. A New York statute permitted a state
agency to ban the showing of "sacrilegious" motion picture films.
A New York court's judgment revoking petitioner's license for
showing a film deemed "sacrilegious" was reversed, and the
statute was declared unconstitutional for vagueness. The signi-
ficance of this decision diminishes when one considers the Court's
traditional readiness to invalidate statutes framed in vague or
uncertain terms.29
25. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
26. Id. at 37.
27. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
28. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
29. See United States v. Cohen Grocery, 255 U.S. 81 (1921); Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948). In Alder v. Bd. of Ed. of City of New York, 342
U.S. 485 (1952), the Court upheld the New York "Feinberg" law which pro-
vided for the removal of teachers for disloyalty, the theory being that the
New York courts had construed the statute to require knowledge of the
organization's purpose before the regulation could apply. Yet in Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), decided the same year, the Court held void
an Oklahoma statute which excluded persons from state employment solely
on the basis of membership in an organization listed by the Attorney General
of the United States as Communist or subversive. In the act, membership




The Court has regarded federal legislation impinging on civil
liberties in much the same light that it has viewed similar state
legislation. Its attitude toward the "clear and present danger"
test is apparent in American Communications Assn. v. Douds,30
decided in 1950. The Labor Management Relations Act, Section
9 (h), required officers of labor organizations to file non-
Communist affidavits in order to avail themselves of the benefits
of the act. In rejecting the union's claims that this requirement
violated the First Amendment, the Court expressed the view
that "a rigid test requiring a showing of imminent danger to the
security of the Nation is an absurdity."' 1
In Dennis v. United States,3 2 decided in 1951, the Court
affirmed the conviction of eleven Communist party leaders under
the Smith Act for conspiring to teach and advocate the overthrow
and destruction of the government by force and violence. The
decision reveals how the personnel of the Court interpreted the
"clear and present danger" test. Chief Justice Vinson, who
announced the judgment of the Court, was joined by Justices
Reed, Burton, and Minton. They expressed the belief that many
of the decisions in which the Court reversed convictions by
applying the "clear and present danger" test were based on the
fact that the interest of the state in those cases was too insub-
stantial to warrant interference with freedom of speech. It
seems that these four Justices would apply the test where a
statute proscribes conduct amounting to mere nonconformity,
but not where the conduct prohibited is of a subversive character.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring, quoted approvingly the state-
ment of Professor Freund that "No matter how rapidly we utter
the phrase 'clear and present danger', or how closely we hyphen-
ate the words, they are not a substitute for the weighing of val-
ues.'" 33 To him the test is "no more conclusive in judicial review
than other attributes of democracy or than a determination of the
people's representatives that a measure is necessary to assure the
safety of government itself. '8 4 Justice Jackson, also concurring,
"would save it, unmodified, for application as a 'rule of reason'
in the kind of case for which it was devised,"8 5 presumably in
cases where the interest of the state is insubstantial. In his view,
30. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
31. Id. at 397.
32. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
33. FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 27 (1949), cited at
341 U.S. 542 (1951).
34. Id, at 544.
35. Id. at 568.
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extending the "clear and present danger" test to cases involving
Communists would be misapplying it. Justice Black, dissenting,
stated, "I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to
sustain laws suppressing freedom of speech and press on the
basis of Congress' or our own notions of mere 'reasonableness'."8 6
Justice Douglas, also dissenting, said, "Free speech-the glory of
our system of government-should not be sacrificed on anything
less than plain and objective proof of danger that the evil advo-
cated is imminent. '37 Justice Clark took no part in the considera-
tion or decision of the case. A reading of the opinions in the
Dennis case leaves one with the impression that the two dissent-
ing Justices would apply the "clear and present danger" test to
all cases in which freedom of speech is an issue while the major-
ity would apply it only in cases where it is "safe" to do so.
With few exceptions the decisions indicate that the Court
has discarded the preferred position view of civil liberties pre-
vailing in the 1940's. Change in personnel has been an important
factor. The Court that rendered the Thornhill decision could
hardly have decided Beauharnais v. Illinois the same day. Some-
where between these two decisions the presumption shifted in
favor of the validity of statutes curtailing civil liberties. Popular
distaste for Communism has influenced the Court; in the words
of Justice Black:
"Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest
the conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is
hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures,
passions, and fears subside, this or some later Court will re-
store the First Amendment liberties to the high preferred
place where they belong in a free society.8 38
Perhaps the cases today are harder to decide. It was clear
that a statute of the Thornhill type, placing a prior restraint on
all picketing was bad; but picketing for demands that could
only be granted by violating a valid criminal statute 9 presents a
question requiring the utmost judicial deliberation. Refusal to
salute a flag on religious grounds40 is a problem of nonconformity
involving less danger than delivering inflammatory speeches. 41
36. Id. at 580.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951).
39. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
40. West Virginia St. Board of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
41. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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The cases in this field require "more exacting judicial scrutiny"42
and a "correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. ' 43 It is
not suggested that the Court should turn the Bill of Rights into
a "suicide pact"; 44 but the Court might well re-examine Justice
Stone's footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,45 and,
where legislation affecting civil liberties is involved, allow "nar-




In the early common law, a plaintiff could escape an impend-
ing adverse judgment by means of two procedural devices, dis-
continuance and nonsuit. The effects of these were sinfilar and
the terms "discontinuance" and "nonsuit" were sometimes ap-
plied interchangeably.
The term "discontinuance" originated in the law of real
property and was first used in pleading and practice' to denote
plaintiff's failure to proceed with his suit from day to day.2
Later the term was applied to any actual discontinuance of
plaintiff's suit, whether voluntary or by order of court. One
noted authority stated that the plaintiff was allowed to discon-
tinue his suit as a matter of right prior to commencement of
trial but could only discontinue it with leave of court after argu-
ment or demurrer.3 Defective pleading or failure to prosecute
the suit in due course was cause for involuntary discontinuance. 4
The effect of a discontinuance was to put the parties out of
court, to charge plaintiff with payment of costs, and to compel
him to begin de novo should he decide to renew his demand. 5
42. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938).
43. Id. at 153, n. 4.
44. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949).
45. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See page 179 supra.
46. Id. at 152, n. 4.
1. Head, History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W.VA. L.Q. 20 (1920).
2. 3 BL. COMM. 296 (2d ed. 1766).
3. 2 TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF KING'S BENCH AND COMMON
PLEAS 732 (2d Am. ed. 1828): "The rule to discontinue is a side-bar rule;
and may be had, as a matter of course, from the clerk of the rules in the
King's Bench, at any time before trial or inquiry .. "
4. STEPHEN, A TR ATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING 216 (3d Am. ed.
1875).
5. 2 TraD'S PRACTICE 732 (2d Am. ed. 1828).
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